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BARELY FAIR, NOT Grossly Unjust
ROBERT A. LEFLAR*
The most disturbing feature of South Carolina's long-arm
jurisdiction in actions in personam is the announced rule that
jurisdiction is to be exercised "to the outer limits" allowed by the
due process clause of the federal constitution. Judge Craven re-
ferred to this South Carolina rule in his Ratliff v. Cooper Labora-
tories, Inc. opinion.1 The rule has been several times stated in
South Carolina state cases2 and has been recognized in earlier
federal cases3 undertaking to apply South Carolina's service law.
The difficulty was stated by the late Professor Elliott E.
Cheatham, one of America's greatest conflict of laws scholars, in
the last piece of major writing that he published before his death:
Is it wise for a court to hold or a legislature explicitly to
provide that a state statute on competence of the courts based
on activities of the defendant in the state shall extend as broadly
as the due process clause permits? A legislature or a court ordi-
narily seeks to make laws that are fair-fair to all sides. The due
process clause of the Constitution, however, is a very special
* B.A., University of Arkansas; LL.B., S.J.D., Harvard Law School; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Director of Appellate Judges Seminars, New York
University; Distinguished Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, University of Arkansas;
Author, American Conflicts Law (1968).
1. "South Carolina has extended its service of process laws to the outer limits allowed
by International Shoe." 444 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1971).
2. Carolina Boat & Plastics Co. v. Glascoat Distributors, 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E. 2d 352,
353 (1967) (". . . requires, as the jurisdictional test, only that the corporation have such
contact with the state of the forum that the maintenance there of an action against it in
personam shall not 'offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'");
Boney v. Trarfs-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E. 2d 508 (1960). These decisions
were reached under the standard "doing business in the state" foreign corporation stat-
utes, judicially reinterpreted to give them this breadth despite earlier and narrower
interpretations. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-23.13, 12-23.14 (Cum. Supp. 1971). South Caro-
lina's oddly located general long-arm act, apparently enacted in 1966 as a part of, or an
amendment to, the Commercial Code, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-801 to 10.2-809, inclusive,
is otherwise a standard modem statute, but seems not yet to have been interpreted as to
its constitutional scope.
3. Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., Inc., 304 F.2d 102, 107 (4th Cir. 1962): "In no case
has that court held that the statutes did not authorize an exercise of jurisdiction which,
in the opinion of that court, was constituionally permissible;" Deering Milliken Research
Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491 (D.S.C. 1970); Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc.,
304 F. Supp. 1247 (D.S.C. 1969); Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publ. Co., 264 F. Supp. 373
(D.S.C. 1967); Siegling v. International Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 262 F.
Supp. 441 (D.S.C. 1966).
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kind of law. It does not prescribe; it only limits. It requires not
that a law be fair, but that it not be too unfair, not grossly
unfair. In applying the due process clause the courts state insis-
tently that they are not to substitute their judgment as to wis-
dom or desirability or even fairness for that of the legislature.
To say that a law does not violate the due process clause is to
say the least possible good about it. Due process is manifestly
not a fair or wise test of the competence of a court over a defen-
dant.'
A number of other states, sometimes more blatantly, have
followed the same path as has South Carolina to the conclusion
that the due process clause lays down the scope of local long-arm
service. California was perhaps the first state to do this, at a time
when it, like South Carolina, had no modern long-arm statute.
The old California statute only authorized substituted service
when the foreign corporation was "doing business" in the state,
and the term "doing business" had been interpreted in the tradi-
tional sense as requiring that the corporation have engaged in a
connected series of related transactions of a business character,
usually extending over a considerable period of time. This was
unfair to plaintiffs whose causes of action arose out of lesser cor-
porate activities within the state. The need for long-arm service
was apparent and, since the legislature had failed to provide for
it, the California Supreme Court did what the legislature should
have done. By reinterpreting the old "doing business" statute, it
held that the statute permitted long-arm service in any case in
which the service would not violate the due process clause.
"'Doing business' within the meaning of section 411 of the Code
of Civil Procedure is synonymous with the power of the state to
subject foreign corporations to local process,"5 said the Court.
Since the Court had thus taken care of the problem it was a long
time before the legislature finally got around to it, and when a
new statute was finally enacted it did no more than extend to
4. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25 ARK.
L. REv. 9, 25 (1971). See also Lefiar, Conflict of Laws, 1969/70 Ann. Survey Am. L. 1, 8;
"If 'good law', as distinguished from 'barely permissible law', is what is wanted in this
area of jurisdiction, the courts should take a more restrained approach in their interpreta-
tion of the long-arm statutes. Due process may be satisfied by some procedures that are
only barely fair."
5. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 858, 323 P.2d 437,
439 (1958). This case was followed and strengthened by F.W. Borgward G.M.B.H. v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 72, 330 P.2d 789 (1958).
[Vol. 25
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BARELY FAIR
all defendants, human as well as corporate, the quasi-emergency
rule previously promulgated by the Court. The eventual statute
was short and superficially simple:
A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.'
An obvious difficulty with this statute is its ambiguity, since its
scope was left to judicial decisions yet to be rendered. Fortun-
ately, there was a companion enactment specifying forum non
conveniens7 as a corollary doctrine, so that the law's unfairness
to distant defendants could sometimes be avoided. The new stat-
ute undoubtedly has the virtue of flexibility, and was certainly
easy to draft, but it did nothing to clarify the rule of law or to ease
the previously self-imposed task of the courts in applying the law.
Other states show a similar history. Several states reinter-
preted their "doing business" statutes, much as California and
South Carolina did.8 Wisconsin started out by reinterpreting its
old statute,' but the legislature of that state reacted quickly,
enacting one of the earliest and most specific but comprehensive
long-arm statutes. 10 Oregon used the same interpretative process
to expand its typical modem long-arm statute to permit service
to the outer margin of what due process permits. 1 The Utah
legislature employed a similar technique when, after specifying
factual situations in which service was specifically authorized, it
declared that the purpose of its statute was to permit exercise
of jurisdiction to the "fullest extent permitted by due process."'"
6. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1969).
7. Id., § 410.30. See Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 HAST. L.J. 1219
(1970).
8. See In Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 224 (6th Cir.
1972) (Ohio statute); Sanders Associates, Inc. v. Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d
915 (1st Cir. 1962) (New Hampshire statute); Key v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 189 A.2d
361 (D.C. App. 1963) (District of Columbia statute); Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto
& Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So.2d 309 (1959) (Mississippi statute). For discussion of
the theory, see Keane and Collins, Changing Concepts of What Constitutes "Doing Busi-
ness" in a State, 42 MARQ. L. REv. 151 (1958); Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing
Business" Statutes, 44 IowA L. REv. 345 (1959).
9. See Koepp v. Peters, 193 F. Supp. 296, 298 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
10. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (1972 Pocket Part).
11. State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetii, 448 P.2d 571 (Ore. 1968).
Judge O'Connell, dissenting, wisely pointed out that this "outer limits" approach is likely
to produce some results that border on "unfair play" and doubtful justice.
12. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-22 to 78-27-28, inclusive. See Note, In Personam Juris-
1973]
3
LeFlar: Barely Fair, Not Grossly Unjust
Published by Scholar Commons, 1973
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Rhode Island statute, 3 like the new one in California, author-
izes the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
due process clause, thus leaving everything to the courts. And in
New Jersey the courts actually imposed this vague standard upon
themselves by Rule of Court.'4
An established judicial procedure has to be very bad indeed
for the United States Supreme Court to declare it unconstitu-
tional under the due process clause. At an earlier time in our
constitutional history it was almost impossible to invalidate a
procedure that dated back to the early days of Anglo-American
common law even though the procedure actually operated to de-
prive a party of his rights, including property, without affording
him any real opportunity to have them litigated. Due process was
deemed to be the process employed by common law and equity
courts in times gone by. "Fair play and substantial justice" was
not yet the name of the game. Old concepts still prevailed when
Ownbey v. Morgan5 was decided in 1921. Delaware's retention of
the "custom of London", under which a defendant in a "foreign
attachment" action was barred from litigating his claim on the
merits unless he first posted bond in the amount of the claim, was
held not to violate due process, and an insolvent defendant un-
able to post the exorbitant bond was denied all remedy. The 1945
redefinition of procedural due process of law in terms of "fair play
and substantial justice"16 probably marked the end of such bar-
baric reliance upon customs two centures old as the test of consti-
tutional protections in the courts, and Ownbey v. Morgan would
presumably be overruled if, God forbid, its issue should again be
presented to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the law's history
remains part of the law, and it remains true that due process still
diction Expended: Utah's Long-Arm Statute, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 222.
13. R.I. GEN. LAws (1969) § 9-5-33 (Jurisdiction if there be "minimum contacts
.... in every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or laws of the United
States").
14. . . . . [JJurisdiction shall be exercised subject to due process of law." New
Jersey R.R. 4:4-d(d).
16. 256 U.S. 94 (1921). "The due process clause does not impose upon the states a
duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice. . . . However desirable
it is that the old forms of procedure be improved with the progress of time, it cannot
rightly be said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal and self-executing
remedy. Its function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular
measures of reform." Id., at 110, 112.
16. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 .(1945).
[Vol. 25
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permits some procedures which fair-minded men would not
adopt.
Another example, closer to the persistent doubts that arise
as to far-fetched long-arm judicial jurisdiction, is the case 17 in
which a default judgment based on a sheriff's false return of
service was sustained. It was said that the defendant, who never
knew that an action was pending against her, had a remedy
against the sheriff's bond. This "remedy" gave her a protection
which satisfied the outer limits of due process. Yet the bond of a
crooked or lazy sheriff who, if he made a false return on one
summons, would do the same thing on a dozen or a hundred
others, is inevitably soon used up so that it affords small help to
one of the sheriff's several victims." Due process may be satisfied,
but the defendant has been bilked.
Judicial jurisdiction in rem has from the common law's be-
ginnings been classified separately, for process serving purposes,
from jurisdiction in personam. Various forms of substituted or
constructive (often long-arm) service have traditionally been per-
mitted when legal proceedings were directed against a res. This
has been true, at least under Harris v. Balk" for purposes of
garnishment or attachment, even when the res was an intangible
-a chose in action that by its non-physical nature could not have
a real location anywhere. The chose in action, without doubt a
property interest and an asset of the creditor, is deemed to have
a situs at any place where the debtor is found so that the credi-
tor's property interest can be reached in rem there. As far as due
process requirements are concerned, the distinction between pro-
ceedings in personam and those in rem is fading away,2 since due
process for both types of proceeding calls for a type of service
reasonably calculated to give actual notice. Actions in rem as well
17. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914).
18. This was a mortgage foreclosure, and the defendant was a resident of the forum
state. Appearance by an unauthorized attorney, as a basis for personal jurisdiction over a
resident of the forum state, presents a similar problem, See Vilas v. Plattsburgh &
M.R.R., 123 N.Y. 440, 25 N.E. 941 (1890) (nonresident); Brown v. Nichols, 42 N.Y. 26
(1870) (resident). For a case in which an extremely attenuated mode of service against a
forum resident was sustained, though without any apparent unfairness since he was delib-
erately hiding out, see Fishman v. Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.
2d 380 (1965). Cf. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451 (1968).
19. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
20. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Atkinson v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
19731
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as actions in personam regularly affect and often destroy personal
rights. So long as Harris v. Balk remains good law, a garnishment
proceeding in rem without personal service on a creditor can have
that effect, and can be extremely burdensome on the creditor.
The burden is especially great if the plaintiff garnishor finds the
garnishee debtor, and brings his garnishment action, at a place
far from where the creditor defendant resides and the garnished
debt arose. In such cases the expense of defending may exceed the
value of the garnished chose in action, so that practically the
creditor defendant may be compelled to permit a default despite
the existence of a good defense against the garnishor's claim. Yet
Harris v. Balk decides that due process of law is not violated by
this often burdensome but hallowed procedure. Perhaps it too
should be overruled, but it is still the law today.
Recently questions have been raised anew as to a sort of
mutation on Harris v. Balk. This is the New York device for
garnishment of the contingent debt owed by a liability insurer to
its insured on a liability insurance policy, by the insured's alleged
accident victim as plaintiff garnishor. New York allows this kind
of garnishment proceeding if the garnishor is a New York resi-
dent, even though the tort cause of action arose elsewhere and the
principal defendant, owner of the garnished chose in action, re-
sides in some other state and is served by long-arm only.' It is
enough that the garnishee debtor, the insurance company, be
doing business in New York so that the debt's imaginary situs can
be located there. Here again the due process clause is apparently
satisfied,"2 though it has been vigorously protested that this type
of so-called garnishment violates both the theory and the social
justification of the remedy.21 The fact that no other state has seen
fit legislatively to follow New York's example, despite the advan-
tage that the plaintiff's personal injury bar can derive from the
21. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967);
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The procedure
has not been carried so far as to allow garnishment by plaintiffs who are nonresidents of
New York. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969). Presumably
this is a forum non conveniens limitation in the local law.
22. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969). See also Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972).
23. See Siegel, Jurisdiction Ad Infinitum: New York's "Rem" Seizure of the Insur-
ance Policy for Jurisdiction in Accident Cases, 20 INLm. & CoMP. L.Q. 99 (1971); Comment,
Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 300, 325 (1970).
[Vol. 25
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procedure, emphasizes the point that what the due process clause
permits may be so nearly unfair, so close to injustice, that fair-
minded lawmakers will reject it.
Other illustrations of permissible procedures that approach
dangerously close to unfair play and substantial injustice might
be given. The use of cognovit clauses as consents to jurisdiction
without service comes near the edge, and most states do not allow
it.Y The application of ordinary long-arm statutes in defamation
actions brought against out-of-state magazine and newspaper
publishers5 raises First Amendment free press issues that, though
not yet fully resolved, leave room for much difference of opinion
as to whether service ought to be permissible to the outer limits
of due process. Long-arm service by a mail order seller of goods
to a consumer in a distant state, in action brought in the seller's
state where the contract of sale was completed and the goods were
shipped," probably ought to be limited to a lesser scope than the
due process clause might permit. These are only some of the more
striking examples.
Apart from the risk of marginal unfairness to defendants
inherent in the exercise of state jurisdiction to the outer limits
allowed by due process, there are other defects and inefficiencies
as well. The ambiguity of the rule operates as a trap for both
litigants and courts.
On a case close to the outer limits dividing line, as was Ratliff
v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., when there is no precedent exactly
in point in the forum state, neither lawyer nor judge can with
certainty know whether long-arm service is good or bad until the
issue has been passed upon by the highest court to which the case
is taken.27 The long-arm statute does not tell them where the line
24. Cf. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405
U.S. 191 (1972) (companion cases). See Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250
N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
25. See Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Newspa-
per Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI. L. Rav. 436 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction over
Publishers, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1967).
26. Compare Prentice Lumber Co. v. Spahn, 474 P.2d 141 (Mont. 1970) (allowing
service), with Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hard. Lumber Co., 259 La. 635, 251
So.2d 45 (1971), and "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. v. Senaca Foods Corp., 280 N.E.2d 423
(Mass. 1972) (not allowing service).
27. This is illustrated by the decision of the District Court in Ratliff v. Cooper
Laboratories, Inc., which sustained the long-arm service that was later, on appeal, held
to violate due process.
1973]
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is drawn, and they derived no guidance from it. The plaintiff's
attorney can only take a chance, either going ahead with service
that may turn out to be ineffective and foregoing suit in some
other surer but less desirable forum, or filing his suit where he
knows he can get good service but with the prospect of poorer
substantive results. He knows that he cannot count on trying
service in the preferred state first then, if the service is disal-
lowed, file anew in the other state, because by that time the other
state's statute of limitations will probably have run. Nothing in
the inexact long-arm law resolves his dilemma.
The trial judge's dilemma is essentially the same as the
lawyer's. Service under the vague service law does not tell him
whether the case is properly before him or not. A trial judge is
often not well equipped to pass upon difficult federal constitu-
tional issues in a hurry. He is inevitably tempted, f the service
is near the margin of what due process allows, to dismiss the case
for inadequate service and let an appeal be taken on that prelimi-
nary ground before he proceeds to trial on the merits. He knows
this will be a time-wasting procedure, if the service is upheld on
appeal. But the alternative is to take evidence on the merits and
render judgment, perhaps by default, then risk the waste of that
extra trial time and effort if the service is held to be bad on
appeal. It would aid judicial efficiency if the outer limits of per-
missible service under any state's law were spelled out with rea-
sonable specificity. This might save some effort for process serv-
ers, too.
It is clear that Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc. was de-
cided correctly, though it decides no more than the invalidity of
service on its own facts. Other marginal cases will arise in
South Carolina, and they also will have to be decided on their
own facts, often after appeals are taken. Clear limits specified
in the long-arm statute, or interpretation of the statute as permit-
ting no more than it specifically authorizes, would avoid most of
the uncertainty which necessitates these doubts and ultimate
appeals. Even more important, clear limits placed somewhat
short of the outer margins of due process would protect defen-
dants against the extremes of fair play and substantial justice
when exercise of jurisdiction based upon the service would be
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